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Abstract
In the recent last years, in particular in the aftermath of the global financial
and economic crisis, many countries initiated economic recovery plans with a
major focus on stimulating green entrepreneurial activities to revive economic
growth. Further, the recovery plans intend to improve a country’s awareness
for a direct orientation towards (strong) sustainability and green growth. Be-
fore discussing strategies towards green growth, in this paper we propose a novel
framework to increase our understanding of the interplay of process R&D ac-
tivities, the strategic price and environmental quality setting of heterogeneous
entrepreneurs in a market where consumers feel up to paying for environmental
quality improvement of a vertically differentiated good. In the paper we de-
compose an entrepreneur’s incentive conducting process R&D in four parts. In
particular we show that an entrepreneur’s incentive of conducting own process
R&D is reduced due to the existence of knowledge-spillovers. Moreover, due
to the strategic complementarities, both in prices as well as in environmental
quality, a strategic effect reinforces the negative consequences of the spillover-
effect. We show that the externalities in the model require corrections based
upon a mixture of fiscal policies and a process R&D subvention scheme estab-
lishing a first-best solution. We further thoroughly discuss the implementation
of a second-best solution and derive environmental policy implications.
1 Introduction
Products claiming to be environmentally friendly or green are on the rise as consumer’s
environmental conscience perceivably increases over the last decade. According to the
recently published GfK Roper Yale Survey on Environmental Issues, the majority of
the US-American and Canadian citizens argue that product purchases should be eco-
friendly (GfK (2008)). Although the market share of green products and related ser-
vices in the United States remains small in the past (1%-2% in 2007)1, according to
a recent analysis conducted by the US Department of Commerce impressively reveals
that this sector is steadily growing in all green product segments (US Department of
Commerce (2010)). For instance, in 2008, US organic food sales grew by approxi-
mately 16% and reached a volume of 22.9 billion US dollar (Organic Trade Association
(2009)). A qualitatively similar pattern can be obtained for Canada by contrasting
US and Canadian food sales data (Bowles (2011)). By reflecting recently published
European Commission surveys for the years 2008 and 2009, nearly 75% (2005: 31%) of
all Europeans would buy environmentally-friendly (European Commission (2008) and
European Commission (2009)) and reading the afore mentioned surveys carefully, con-
sumers seem to be even prepared to pay a price premium for environmentally-friendly
products (Bowles (2011), European Commission (2008) and European Commission
(2009)). The soaring importance of green growth can be also observed in China: the
12th Five Year Plan particularly emphasizes the increasing importance of going green
for China’s economic growth (Casey and Koleski (2011)).
The global relevance of the green sector can be also fleshed out in the context of the re-
cent financial and economic crisis. Although the priorities investing in environmentally
friendly products or services are not new, it seems that particularly in the aftermath
of the recent economic and financial crisis, there seems to be a forum for a revitalized
and more thorough discussion of identifying drivers for sustainable economic growth.
As pointed out by the OECD (2011), in particular fostering green entrepreneurship2
seems to be one of the promising key boosting economic activities as nearly 99% of all
OECD countries’ firms (OECD-WPSMEE (2010)) belong to the small and medium-
1Refer to the survey published by the US Department of Commerce (2010).
2In this paper we follow Isaak (2005) and assume that an entrepreneur acts in a green sector
of an economy with a strong commitment towards sustainability. For a detailed description of the
characteristics of a green sector please refer to OECD/Eurostat (1999) definition.
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sized (SME) sector3 and it is expected that green innovations can be particularly traced
back to young firms (OECD-WPSMEE (2010)). Further, by referring to the various
fiscal stimulus packages initiated by most of the economically leading countries in re-
sponse to the global economic and financial crisis, we observe that these are to some
degree designed for encouraging growth on sustainable grounds. For instance, China’s
administration has devoted almost 40% of its fiscal stimulus package of USD 586 billion
to foster Chinas’ green investments (Girouard (2010)), which also comprises process
R&D investments into energy technologies, and funds to improve firms’ production
infrastructure (Hammer et al. (2011)). In 2009, South Korea invested 79% of its stim-
ulus package in the green sector, which nearly accounts for 7% of its GDP.4 For the
United States, it is expected that the USD 90 billion Recovery Act accounts for nearly
720,000 jobs to be created or saved (OECD-WPSMEE (2010)), whereas green funds
in the European Union accounts for 8.5% of the total stimulus funds (HSBC Global
Research (2009)). Hence ”[...] the study of green entrepreneurship went from being
simply ”fashionable” to being essential for policy guidance. [...]”5.
As pointed out by (OECD-WPSMEE (2010)), before discussing new strategies towards
green growth, we first have to increase our understanding regarding the interplay of
sustainable production of green products and services, the market structure and the
management practices of production processes of green entrepreneurs, which defines
the core of this contribution. As it seems to be a challenging task to separate green
entrepreneurship from entrepreneurship (OECD (2011)), unambiguously the question
arises how entrepreneurs who are heterogeneous with respect to their environmental
product quality compete in a market where, based on the above stated empirical evi-
dence, consumers obviously are prepared to pay for environmental quality of a product
which is vertically differentiated in environmental quality.
Commonly, it is assumed that entrepreneurs via creative destruction6 are able to either
improve their production processes or to improve their product quality or both. Green
3Entrepreneurship and SME’s are closely related (Audretsch 2007). Although there exists no clear
cut definition how to characterize concisely a SME, nevertheless, Acs and Audretsch (1988) define
SMEs as firms with less than 500 employees.
4See United Nations Environmental Program UNEP (2009).
5Refer to part I, chapter 2, p.24, OECD (2011).
6This well established notion of an entrepreneur comprises his creative destruction function which
can be traced back to Schumpeter (1934): the inherent dynamics induced by innovations due to R&D
endeavors will replace existing and inferior technologies by new and superior technologies and, hence,
enhances growth.
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or not, to cope with the specific attributes directly associated with an entrepreneur,
for instance the creation of new innovative products, services and processes, ex-ante we
have to define an entrepreneur’s technology strategy, which can result either in a prod-
uct or a process innovation (Vaona and Pianta (2008))7. Whereas product innovations
are assumed to directly emerge from the result of technological competitiveness with
respect to product development, process innovations which scope seems to be broader,
are directly associated with a strategy of searching for new or more efficient (pro-
duction) technologies, as the investment in more efficient machineries (Antonucci and
Pianta (2002), Pianta (2001)) and the improvement of management operations and/or
organizational change in firms8. With respect to the above mentioned literature9, it
seems to be appropriate primarily to focus on process innovations10.
In a nutshell, the core of the paper is twofold: first, we develop a three-stage model
discussing the interplay of conducting process R&D activities and the price and envi-
ronmental quality setting behavior of heterogeneous entrepreneurs in a market where
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmental’s quality improvement
7This assumption is based on a well-established literature. For instance, refer to Antonucci and
Pianta (2002), Cohen and Klepper (1994), Edquist, Hommen and McKelvey (2001), Pianta (2001)
and Scherer (1991).
8We inherently assume that entrepreneurs to some extent are not restricted to conducting R&D.
However, this is a simplification of reality. For instance, one crucial barrier for entrepreneurial activities
are financial restrictions such as credit constraints. Although important and object of current research
(for a comprehensive discussion regarding this issue refer to Antony, Maußner and Klarl (2012)), we
neglect this issue as our primary focus is not directly related towards a discussion of the presence of
credit constraints and its implications for green growth driven by entrepreneurial activities. As clearly
beyond the scope of this contribution, we leave this discussion open as an avenue for further research.
9In particular, we follow (OECD-WPSMEE (2010)).
10Vaona and Pianta (2008) evaluating a rich manufacturing firm’s panel-data set for eight Euro-
pean countries (Austria, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) on a sectorial level, conclude that firm size does not play a decisive role in identifying
determinants for conducting either process or product innovations. This result is in contrast to earlier
findings: Scherer (1991), for instance, concludes that the share of process innovations relative to prod-
uct innovations increases with firm size. In this article we assume that entrepreneurs which are closely
associated with SMEs (Audretsch (2007)) conducting process innovations. Nevertheless, it is worth
mentioning that there exists a large literature regarding the innovative power of smaller and larger
firms without directly focusing on product and process innovations. Cohen and Klepper (1996) and
Scherer (1965) by investigating the link between firm size and innovation activities, found that larger
firms are more innovative than smaller ones. Whereas the afore mentioned two studies concentrate
on R&D inputs, Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Acs and Audretsch (1991) found by directly linking
the R&D activity with patent activity that smaller firms are more innovative.
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of a vertically differentiated good. Second, based on the models’ results, we compare
the welfare-implications for a regulated and unregulated economy with the social planer
solution, when the governmental authority’s aim is to correct for arising externalities
stemming from the entrepreneur’s market power – resulting, as shown, in excessive
product-differentiation as well as in excessive environmental damage – and occurring
process R&D spillovers. Before we introduce the setting of the model, the next sec-
tion deals with a short review of the relevant literature to which the model is directly
related.
2 Related Literature
By referring to our research question motivated in the first chapter of this paper, we
can identify two major strands of literature which we combine in this paper. The
first embeds the environmental quality of a product into existing models of vertical
product differentiation in the spirit of Mussa and Rosen (1978), Cremer and Thisse
(1994) and Cremer and Thisse (1999). Following Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Bre´card
(2008) and Bre´card (2012) we assume that the considered product market is vertically
differentiated in environmental quality. Although it seems that the majority of US
consumers base their purchase decision primarily on prices and not on environmental
quality, several studies conducted by the European Commission (2008) and the Euro-
pean Commission (2009) clearly state that it seems that consumers are willing to pay
a price premium for green products.
The model presented in this contribution is closest related to Lombardini-Riipinen
(2005), Bre´card (2008) and Bre´card (2012). Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) thoroughly
study the welfare-implications of an emission and ad-valorem tax in a market of
vertically-differentiated products with respect to environmental quality, embedded
into a two-step-game. Assuming full market coverage, quality is strictly increasing
marginal production costs and a representative consumer buys one product or noth-
ing, Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) found that the first-best optimum of product-quality
can be obtained by a combination of an ad-valorem and imposed emission tax. If the
policy-maker can only set the environmental tax, the second-best policy is imposing the
Pigouvian tax. Bre´card (2012) extends the analysis of Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) by
explicitly introducing green network effects, as many purchase decision are influenced
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by social ties.11 As prices and produced qualities are strategic complements, Bre´card
(2012) conclude that if the green network effect is greater compared to the non-green
network effect, the environmental quality of both products decreases. Conversely, if the
non-green network effect dominates the green, environmental product quality seems to
increase.
The second strand of literature directly focuses on the strategic interaction between
product differentiation, the choice of R&D activities and product market competition.
The impetus of the majority of these studies can be traced back to a comparison of
welfare-implications based on a Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium, given the presence
of (uncertain) product and/or process innovation’s outcome12. We follow Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Bester and Petrakis (1993),
Suzumura (1992), Qiu (1997), Boone (2001) and others by, as mentioned above, solely
focusing on process R&D activities. Further, we make the reasonable assumption
that the innovation process is proportional to the investments in R&D. Hence, R&D
activities are assumed to be deterministic.13
If we draw the two strands of literature together, we consequently arrive at a three-
stage model which describes on the first stage the optimal process R&D choice directly
affecting the cost structure of producing the green and/or the non-green product. Given
the outcome of the first stage, on the second stage the competitors have to decide over
the products’ price levels, and given the outcome of the first and second stage, on the
third stage, the firms have to decide on the environmental quality of the produced
products.
By solving the game through backwards induction, we decompose an entrepreneur’s in-
centive conducting process R&D by referring to the game’s equilibrium conditions. In
particular we show that an entrepreneur’s incentive of conducting own process R&D,
which in turn reduces production costs and hence increases welfare, is reduced due
to the existence of knowledge-spillovers stemming from own R&D activities. More-
over we identify a strategic effect conducting R&D which reinforces the spillover-effect.
We find that increasing R&D efficiency is welfare-increasing, whereas the existence of
11For a justification of the inclusion of network effects refer to Bre´card (2012).
12For instance, refer to Motta (1993), Symeonidis (2003), Qiu (1997), and Vives (1985).
13Hence, our model directly corresponds to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Suzumura (1992)
and Qiu (1997). Contrary to Tishler and Milstein (2009), who discuss the relationship of uncertain
R&D investments and firm survivability, we feel that this is a passable assumption as our focus is not
to discuss market entry and exit incentives governed by uncertain outcomes of R&D investments.
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knowledge-spillover tends to decrease welfare in the unregulated economy. Further, we
find that due to imperfect competition, excessive product differentiation reduces envi-
ronmental quality below the social optimal level. We show that a first-best solution can
be realized by imposing, first, an ad-valorem tax, second, an emission-tax and, third,
a process R&D subvention scheme. The article which combines environmental topics
with industrial and public economics issues is part of the literature on the optimality
of (environmental) taxation and on the literature of strategic effects of R&D activities.
3 The Setting
Central for our model is the assumption of a duopoly model of vertical product dif-
ferentiation developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Cremer and Thisse (1994) and
Cremer and Thisse (1999). A common feature of these models is that each firm pro-
duces under full information one vertically differentiated variant of a good and sets
its price. Following Bre´card (2012), we assume, first, that a green product exhibits
a better quality than a standard product and, hence, is more expensive. Second, the
remaining characteristics of the product are unaffected by changing the environmental
items of the same product. Hence, the papers closest to the present one are Bre´card
(2012) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005)14. However, this model presents two extensions
that distinguish it from those papers significantly. First, it is assumed that each en-
trepreneur performs R&D investments to reduce its production costs and, second, as a
direct consequence of R&D activities, knowledge spillovers as a positive externality in
the production process have to be considered. The following subsections are devoted to
the introduction of the key elements of the model. Subsection 3.4. explains the timing
of the three-step game.15
3.1 Consumer Preferences
We assume a given continuum of consumers whose degree of environmental conscious-
ness θ16 is uniformly distributed over [θ; θ] with unit density function θ = θ − 1 and
14As Bre´card (2012) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) for instance, we assume free-market entry.
15It is worth noting that the setting is chosen in the way to guarantee an analytically tractable
solution of the game.
16This interpretation of θ is in line with Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and Moraga-Gonza´les and
Padro´n-Fumero (2002) for instance.
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θ > 1. Each consumer has to decide whether to buy a green or brown quality qi with
qg > qb and i = {b, g}. The subscript b stands for the lower brown quality, the in-
dex g represents the green product quality. Following Motta (1993), we assume that
consumers’ preferences are completely mapped by the following utility function:
Ui = θqi − pi, (3.1)
where pi stands for the price of product i
17. Assuming full market coverage18, we have
to make sure that θ ≥ θˆ ≡ pb
qb
. The representative consumer who is exactly indifferent
to consuming one variant of the green or one variant of the brown product can be
characterized by the environmental consciousness parameter θ˘ which can be computed
as:
θ˘ =
pg − pb
qg − qb . (3.2)
Using the information provided by equation (3.2), the demand for the high quality ng =
θ− θ˘ is given by: ng = θ+ pb−pgqg−qb . Accordingly, the demand for the brown quality variant
can be computed as: nb = 1−
(
θ + pb−pg
qg−qb
)
. To guarantee a market share ni ∈ (0, 1) for
both firms i, we have to impose that qg > qb and (qg−qb)(θ−1) < (pg−pb) < (qg−qb)θ.
3.2 Environmental Quality
Following Bre´card (2008), Bre´card (2012) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), product
environmental quality can be improved by increasing an entrepreneur’s specific abate-
ment effort defined by (e− ei), with e as the per unit emission of firm i and ei as the
emission level per product unit after investing in an appropriate abatement technology.
Hence, the total emission level Ψ(ei, ni) of the economy directly reads as:
Ψ(ei, ni) = Σi[(e− ei)ni]. (3.3)
3.3 Production Sector
3.3.1 Production Costs
Each entrepreneur produces a good which is vertically differentiated in environmental
quality. The ith entrepeneur’s production technology assumed in this model implies
17Assuming a more general utility-function yields to a non-analytical solution of the game.
18For instance, we follow Bre´card (2012) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) by assuming that the
market is fully covered.
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per unit variable cost, ci which are assumed to be strictly increasing and convex in
product environmental quality. In line with the relevant literature19, we assume that an
increase in the entrepreneur-specific abatement effort directly increases product quality
and hence, leads to an immediate increase of each entrepreneur’s variable production
costs. Thus, the ith entrepreneur’s variable per unit cost function reads as:
Ci(qi) =
1
2
cq2i , (3.4)
with c > 0 as a positively known constant20.
3.3.2 Process R&D Activities
Additionally, each entrepreneur can reduce its variable unit production costs by con-
ducting R&D investments. Conducting process R&D investments should shift the ith
entrepreneur’s marginal production costs downward21. Although there is little empiri-
cal evidence to which one can refer to model the functional of the R&D costs, most of
the theoretically published literature suggest that R&D costs are linear or quadratic
with respect to the specific R&D outcome. Among others, we refer to d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), Qui (1997), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Tishler and Milstein
(2009) and assume that R&D costs are convex and strictly increasing in the respective
R&D outcome χi > 0 for i = {g, b} and i 6= j. Hence, the R&D costs for the ith
entrepreneurs’s R&D program can be written as:
Ri(χi) =
1
2
χ2i for i = {g, b} and i 6= j. (3.5)
3.3.3 R&D Spillover
As primarily known from the endogenous growth theory, performing R&D investments
opens the door for knowledge spillovers stemming from competitor’s j R&D investments
(i 6= j), which can be used for the purpose of reducing its own production costs even
without performing own R&D. Hence, we follow the commonly made assumption that
knowledge spillovers appear in the R&D outcomes22. Benefiting from this externality
19Refer to Cremer and Thisse (1999), Eriksson (2004), Conrad (2005), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005)
and Bre´card (2012).
20See Cremer and Thisse (1994) and Cremer and Thisse (1999).
21Of course, a R&D program can have demand enhancing and cost reduction effects simultaneously.
22Alternatively, spillovers can be directly associated with R&D investments. Refer to Amir (2000)
for a comparison of these assumptions.
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postulates that the rival entrepreneur is endued with sufficient absorptive capacities
measured by the parameter ξ ∈ (0, 1). The larger ξ, the larger the absorptive capacities
of the jth entrepreneur, and hence, the higher is the cost saving potential for his own
production process. Alternatively, ξ ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as a measure of the
tightness of an entrepreneur’s knowledge network23. This interpretation is qualitatively
in line with the contribution of Bre´card (2012), who discusses the effects of green
network effects on environmental product quality. While the contribution of Bre´card
(2012) focuses on the demand side of the model, the impetus here is the discussion of
network effects on the production side.
3.4 Timing of the game
The design and the events of the game in the context of environmental quality and
price-setting can be directly traced back to the contributions made by Lombardini-
Riipinen (2005) and Bre´card (2012). Obviously, the aforementioned contribution’s
game design consists of two-steps: In the first stage, firms compete in environmental
product quality, whereas they compete in prices on the second stage. As we will see,
modeling the choice of a process R&D program implies a three-step game. The timing
of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: Economy’s entrepreneurs choose simultaneously their own process R&D activities.
The outcome is given by χ∗i with i 6= j.
Stage 2: Given the resulting R&D outcome χ∗i with i 6= j, each entrepreneur decides on
the environmental quality q∗i , i 6= j which will be offered to the consumers.
Stage 3: Given the results obtained from the first and second stage, both entrepreneurs
decide on their offered prices p∗i , i 6= j.
4 Unregulated equilibrium
In this section, we present the solution of the game introduced in section 3.4. The game
is solved with backward induction in order to obtain the sub-game perfect equilibria.
23The latter interpretation can be directly associated with the OECD’s supported green growth
strategy. Pursing green growth, one of the OECD’s aims is to increase technology transfer which
efficiency depends on knowledge-networks. For further details see OECD-WPSMEE (2010).
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As mentioned above, we assume that θ¯ is chosen sufficiently high to ensure full market
coverage24.
Lemma 1. ∀ ξ < ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
4c
)
, θ ≥ 1
4
√
7 + 1 establish a pure-strategy and sub-game
perfect equilibrium which is in line with full market coverage.
Proof. See appendix A.7 
4.1 Solution of Stage 3
The operating profit on stage 3 of each entrepreneur is given by
pioi (pi, qi, χi, χj) = [pi − ci(qi) + ρχi + ξχj]ni with i 6= j. (4.1)
As the entrepreneurs compete in prices on stage 3 of the game, pi is chosen to maximize
(4.1) given the price-setting behavior of its rival j. The outcome of the first sub-game
results in the following prices:
p∗g =
1
6
(
2qg
(
θ¯ + cqg + 1
)− 2θ¯qb + cq2l − 2 (χg(ξ + 2ρ) + χb(2ξ + ρ) + qb)) (4.2)
p∗b =
1
6
(
2
(
qb
(
θ¯ + cql − 2
)− χg(2ξ + ρ)− χb(ξ + 2ρ))− 2 (θ¯ − 2) qg + cq2g) . (4.3)
Using the results given by equations (4.2) and (4.3), ceteris paribus, we can directly
observe that increasing the entrepreneurs’ R&D activities denoted by χi, i 6= j obvi-
ously leads to a direct decrease of both product prices. We may conjecture that the
price reduction of both offered qualities can be directly traced back to a strategic effect
caused by conducting process R&D. Increasing its own R&D effort enables the ith
entrepreneur to reduce its marginal costs, which in turn opens the door for business
stealing25 activities at the expense of its competitor j by decreasing pi. Accordingly,
24Please refer to appendix A.7 which derives the conditions for full market coverage for the unreg-
ulated economy.
25To avoid confusion, the notion of the terminus business stealing, which can be primarily linked
to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and others, is slightly different in our contribution. In the context of
the endogenous growth theory, the terminus business stealing describes in its simplest fashion the fact
that new technologies make old technologies obsolete. Firms therefore have an incentive to invest too
much in R&D. In our model, we use the terminus to simply describe the fact that an entrepreneur
can steal market shares from its competitor.
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this forces entrepreneur j to reduce its prices as well, avoiding profit cuts. At the end
of the day, the price reduction by j reduces the incentives for the ith entrepreneur
conducting own process R&D. This result corresponds to the findings made by Lin and
Saggi (2002).
Further, the negative strategic effect is reinforced by a negative spillover effect. Knowl-
edge, which is generated from entrepreneurs’ R&D activities, may spill over to com-
peting entrepreneurs. The parameter ξ which appears in equations (4.2) and (4.3)
measures the degree of knowledge spillovers. Now, it is rather obvious that increas-
ing ξ reduces the rival’s incentive of conducting own process R&D because everything
equal, increasing ξ reduces the rival’s product price level. In turn, knowing the rival’s
behavior, the existence of knowledge spillover will reduce the incentive to perform own
process R&D as well.
Although we will discuss the interconnectedness of both effects more thoroughly in sec-
tion 4.4, we can conjecture that increasing process innovation expenditures of both en-
trepreneurs induces a pronounced defensive price strategy for both competitors, which
is reinforced by the strategic complementarities in prices.
4.2 Solution of Stage 2
Anticipating the product prices given by equations (4.2) and (4.3), each entrepreneur
maximizes equation (4.1) to decide on the offered quality level qi. In appendix A.1
we show that only one candidate for the quality game equilibrium satisfies both, the
second-order conditions for an entrepreneur’s operating profit maximization as well as
the stability condition of the obtained equilibrium. This equilibrium is fully defined by
the following quality vector
q∗g =
12θ¯ + 8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb) + 3
12c
(4.4)
q∗b =
12θ¯ + 8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb)− 15
12c
. (4.5)
Using equations (4.4) and (4.5), the demand for the green and brown products, ng and
nb respectively, can be written as:
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n∗g =
1
18
[8c(ξ − ρ) (χb − χg) + 9] (4.6)
n∗b =
1
18
[8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb) + 9] . (4.7)
Employing equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7), the entrepreneurs’ opti-
mal operating profits of the second stage reads as:
pio∗g =
(8c(ξ − ρ) (χb − χg) + 9) 2
216c
(4.8)
pio∗b =
(8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb) + 9) 2
216c
. (4.9)
The existence of process R&D activities obviously generates two conflicting impacts on
product’s environmental quality induced by the strategic complementarities in product
qualities26.
On the one hand, all other things being equal, from equations (4.4) to (4.5) together
with the assumption that ρ > ξ, we can directly deduce that increasing the process in-
novation activities for the green product χg, this negatively impacts the environmental
qualities of both products by shifting the green entrepreneur’s reaction function down-
wards and those of the brown entrepreneur to the upper left of the defined quality space.
This reaction can be justified as follows: increasing χg lowers the marginal production
costs of the green entrepreneur and, accordingly, enables the green entrepreneur to
increase its own market share ng and operating-profits at the expense of its competi-
tor even by lowering its own product quality qg
27. Thus, for the case of the green
entrepreneur it seems that the price-decreasing effect dominates the quality-reduction
effect as ng increases with decreasing θ˘. For the brown quality producing entrepreneur
26Let i denote the green entrepreneur. Inserting (4.2) and (4.3) in the
operating-profits equation (4.1) and computing the cross partial derivative
∂2pioi (·)
∂qi∂qj
=
− 1486 (−1.6 (χi − χj)− 9) (9− 1.6 (χi − χj)), we find that this expression is clearly positive for
χi ∈
[
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χj ;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χj
]
, together with ρ > ξ and i 6= j. The same result can be obtained for
the brown quality producing entrepreneur. Hence, the two qualities are strategic complementarities.
27The incentive to do so can be underpinned with the assumption made at the beginning of this
paper that qg > qb has to be fulfilled in any case.
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however, the price-reduction effect, which tends to increase the demand for the brown
quality does not offset the quality reduction effect which tends to decrease nb and its
operating profits. In this context it is worth noting that although reducing qb obvi-
ously curbs the brown entrepreneur’s operating profits, the brown entrepreneur has an
incentive to do so, as cost-saving potentials induced by process R&D activities of the
green entrepreneur tends to increase the brown entrepreneur’s profit stream and hence,
at least abates the negative effect on the brown entrepreneur’s market share nb and
operating profit stream. This parallels the finding of Toshimitsu (2003).
On the other hand, increasing the process innovation activities of the brown product
producing entrepreneur, χg, this positively affects both levels of offered product quality
given ρ > ξ. Lowering its marginal costs, the brown quality qb could be offered at
a reduced price which enables the brown entrepreneur to steal market shares from
the green entrepreneur. However, as the green entrepreneur still offers the higher
quality, reducing the quality of qb would directly curb the market share and operating
profit stream of the brown quality producing entrepreneur. Instead, the brown quality
producing entrepreneur has an incentive to increase its quality level as the green quality
is a strategic complement for the brown entrepreneur. In turn, the green entrepreneur
increases its produced product quality as well. In a nutshell, the price-decreasing effect
which positively affects the brown entrepreneur’s profit stream and market share is
reinforced by an quality-increasing effect due to the strategic complementary of offered
product qualities.
Moreover, the negative knowledge-spillover externality ξ directly influences prices,
quantities, market share and the entrepreneur’s operating profits differently. Given the
green process R&D activities on stage two of the game are higher compared to those
of the brown entrepreneur, which seems to be a reasonable assumption, this tends to
increase both product qualities, given the knowledge-spillover externality ξ increases.
This tends to decrease the market share ng of the green entrepreneur from which in
turn the brown entrepreneur benefits by increasing its market share and operating
profit stream pio∗b
28. Although being negative for the green entrepreneur, the society’s
environmental quality seems to benefit from this source of knowledge-spillover exter-
28The green entrepreneur has an incentive to increase its product quality as the brown entrepreneur
can decrease its product price more than the green entrepreneur, given ξ increases: | ∂2pg∂χg∂ξ | = 13 < 23 =
| ∂2pb∂χg∂ξ |. Doing so, the green entrepreneur is indeed not able to counterbalance the loss of market-share
and operating-profit loss induced by the price reduction as ξ increases but increasing qg works against
the negative knowledge spillover effect as θ˘ decreases. Being strategic complementarities, the brown
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nality. However, increasing the productivity of R&D process investments (ρ) tends
to decrease the society’s environmental quality by decreasing product quality, given
χg > χb
29. Given χg < χb, we obtain quite the opposite results
30. Assuming χg = χb,
the influence of ρ and ξ on prices, quantities, market share the entrepreneur’s operating
profits obviously vanishes due to the symmetric design of R&D activities.
As a direct consequence of the above outlined discussion, we can postulate the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium product differentiation has to be independent of pro-
cess R&D investment activities conducted by the entrepreneurs. Moreover, product
differentiation has to be independent of the knowledge-spillover externality ξ and the
process R&D productivity ρ31.
Proof : Employing equations (4.4) and (4.9), equilibrium product differentiation reads
as: (q∗g − q∗b ) = 32c which depends solely on the positive constant c stemming from the
entrepreneur’s variable per unit cost function32. 
4.3 Solution of Stage 1
The objective of both entrepreneurs is to choose their optimal process R&D program
such that their profits, defined as the operating profits given by the equations (4.8) and
quality rises as well.
29Now, the green entrepreneur has an incentive to decrease its product quality as the green en-
trepreneur can decrease its product price more than the brown entrepreneur, given ρ increases:
| ∂2pg∂χg∂ρ | = 23 > 13 = |
∂2pb
∂χg∂ρ |. Still producing the higher quality but saving costs due to quality re-
duction, the green entrepreneur can increase its market-share and operating-profit at the expense
of the brown-quality producing Entrepreneur as θ˘ decreases. Being strategic complementarities, the
brown quality falls as well, which decreases production costs and ceteris paribus increases operating
profits. Hence, this limits the negative consequences for the lower-quality producing Entrepreneur.
30The argumentation is similar to those given in footnotes 25 and 26, respectively. The arguments
given in footnote 25 belong to the case where ρ increases, given χb > χg,whereas the arguments given
in footnote 26 fit to the scenario where ξ increases, given χb > χg.
31These results offer similarities with the results found by Bre´card (2012). She concludes that
consumer network externalities do not impact product differentiation. A similar result is obtained by
Lambertini and Orsini (2005). Although the origin of their examined externality (consumer vanity)
is different from our (knowledge-spillover) and Bre´card’s (2012) (consumer conformity) study, finally,
we arrive at the same implication valid for all afore mentioned studies: product differentiation is
independent of the examined origin of externality.
32The result is identical to those obtained by Bre´card (2012).
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(4.9), respectively, net the R&D costs depicted by equation (3.5) will be maximized.
Hence the profits are given by
pig(·) = pio∗g −Rg =
(8c(ξ − ρ) (χb − χg) + 9) 2
216c
− χ
2
g
2
(4.10)
pib(·) = pio∗b −Rb =
(8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb) + 9) 2
216c
− χ
2
b
2
. (4.11)
Maximization of equations (4.10) and (4.11) with respect to χg and χb, respectively,
results in the Nash equilibrium in the entrepreneurs’ R&D outcomes which are identical
for both entrepreneurs and represented by:
χi =
2
3
(ρ− ξ) for i 6= j. (4.12)
The second-order conditions require:
16
27
c(ξ − ρ)2 < 1 for i 6= j. (4.13)
The next proposition summarizes the conditions which have to be fulfilled simultane-
ously guaranteeing that the equilibrium with respect to the process R&D outcome –
represented by equation (4.12) – is indeed a unique and stable interior solution33.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium defined by equation (4.12) is, first, a unique and,
second, a stable interior non-deviation solution, given the following four conditions are
simultaneously met:
Condition 1: The second-order conditions for profit maximization represented by
equation (4.13) are fulfilled.
33The proposition is based on Tishler and Milstein (2009). However, Tishler and Milstein (2009)
only provide conditions for an equilibrium being a unique and stable interior solution. But these
conditions are only necessary for a Nash-equilibrium from which no player has an incentive to deviate
from. Hence, we first prove that a given equilibrium offers a unique and stable interior solution and,
given these assumptions are fulfilled, we proceed by investigating the non-deviation condition from
that Nash-equilibrium. Details can be found in appendix A.2.
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Condition 2: The Routh-Hurwitz stability condition, which requires(
∂2pii(·)
∂χ2i
∂2pij(·)
∂χ2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)
∂χi∂χj
∂2pij(·)
∂χj∂χi
)
> 0. (4.14)
Condition 3: The process R&D outcomes are strictly positive, that is, χi >
0 for i 6= j.
Condition 4: The equilibrium represented by (χ∗g, χ
∗
b) has to fulfill the non-deviation
conditions. These conditions are given as:
pig(χ
∗
g, χ
∗
b) ≥ pig(χg, χ∗b), for χg ≥ 0 (4.15)
pib(χ
∗
g, χ
∗
b) ≥ pig(χ∗g, χb), for χb ≥ 0. (4.16)
Proof: See appendix A.2 and appendix A.3. 
As shown with appendix A.2 together with A.3, the equilibrium defined by equation
(4.12) indeed defines a unique and stable interior solution from which no entrepreneur
has an incentive to deviate from.
Figure 4.1 graphically represents the sub-game perfect process R&D equilibrium in the
context of the stability conditions for the environmental quality game depicted in the
R&D outcome space34.
Hence, the identified parameter restriction χg ∈
[
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
]
, for ρ > ξ
and i = {g, b} for i 6= j guarantees an interior and stable solution, both, for the
product’s environmental quality, as well as for the process R&D game.
Now, we proceed by providing an interpretation of the obtained process R&D out-
come Nash-equilibrium. Due to the symmetric specification of the knowledge-spillover
influence (ξ) as well as of the productivity of the entrepreneur’s own process R&D
denoted by ρ, it is not surprising that the process R&D outcomes, represented by
equation (4.12), are identical. Obviously, the optimal process R&D outcome for both
entrepreneurs depends negatively on ξ and positively on ρ. This solution makes sense,
as the incentive conducting own process R&D increases with the productivity of own
34With respect to figure 4.1, please note that
(
∂2pii(·)
∂q2i
∂2pij(·)
∂q2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)
∂qi∂qj
∂2pij(·)
∂qj∂χi
)
=
− c2(8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)−9)(8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)+9)1458 ≡ Ξ > 0 for χg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
)
. Please refer
to appendix A.1.
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Figure 4.1: Graphical representation of the sub-game perfect process R&D equilibrium
process R&D endeavors but is attenuated by the chance of benefiting from knowledge-
spillover from rivals’ R&D efforts. Hence, this findings extends the results of Lin and
Saggi (2002) as not only the rival’s price reduction reduces the incentives conducting
own process R&D but also the possibility benefiting from knowledge-spillover. We
may conjecture that the strategic price effect and the knowledge-spillover effect rein-
force each other.
Given the solution of the R&D outcomes denoted by equations (4.12), we can directly
infer from that optimality condition on the prices, the demand for the green and brown
product, as well as the entrepreneur’s profits. Using equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and
(4.5) with (4.12), the prices are given as:
p∗∗g =
1
96
[
24θ¯
(
2θ¯ + 1
)
+ 64(ξ2 − ρ2) + 75] (4.17)
p∗∗b =
1
96
[
24θ¯
(
2θ¯ − 5)+ 64(ξ2 − ρ2) + 147] . (4.18)
Obviously, product prices tend to decrease non-linearly by increasing ρ and increase
non-linearly by increasing ξ. Once again, this reflects, on the one hand, the cost-
reduction effect of conducting own process R&D (ρ) and, on the other hand, it im-
pressively shows that the existence of knowledge spillover (ξ) tends to increase the
17
price level as product quality is increasing to compensate the loss of market share and
operating profit cuts caused by the rival’s process R&D price level reduction. Hence,
these results confirm our conjectures regarding the strategic complements of product
prices as well as environmental product qualities35.
It is straightforward that product differentiation is still given by (q∗∗g − q∗∗b ) = 32c .
Employing equations (4.6) and (4.7) together with (4.12), the demand for green and
brown product qualities is ni = 0.5 for i = {g, b} as equilibrium R&D outcomes are
identical. Hence, Entrepreneur’s operating profits based on equations (4.8) and (4.9)
are the same and can be calculated as pi∗i =
3
8c
for i = {g, b}. The equilibrium envi-
ronmental consciousness parameter θ˘ at which a representative consumer is indifferent
between demanding a green or brown product quality, is the same as computed by
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and given as
θ˘ = θ¯ − 1
2
. (4.19)
Hence, endogenizing process R&D investments on stage 3 reduces
θ˘ =
1
18
(
18θ¯ + 8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb)− 9
)
(4.20)
to equation to (4.19)36.
4.4 Decomposition of process R&D incentives
In sections 4.1 and 4.2 we have made some conjectures regarding strategic behavior of
both entrepreneurs regarding process R&D investments. For instance, we have stated
that both entrepreneurs have an incentive to under-invest in process R&D due to the
35Please note that this result is not at odds with the discussion regarding the quality- and price-
setting behavior of the entrepreneurs accomplished in sections 4.1. and 4.2. For instance, the prices
represented by equations (4.17) and (4.18) results, given both entrepreneurs optimally choose their
level of environmental product-quality and process R&D outcome.
36If we reduce the three-step game to a two-step game by neglecting the R&D choice, we finally
arrive at equation (4.20). Obviously, the spillover parameter ξ affects the environmental consciousness
parameter θ˘ in a positive or negative manner, depending on the sign of χg − χb. Although in our
model, the spillover-effect appears on the supply side and not as in Bre´card’s (2012) set-up, on the
demand side of the model, qualitatively we arrive at the same result, that is, the spillover effect directly
affects the consumer’s taste parameter regarding environmental consciousness. In this way the model
in this paper can be seen as a qualitative generalization of the models proposed by Bre´card (2012)
and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005).
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existence of knowledge-spillovers. In this section we present the key to understand
this result, that is to carefully decompose the relevant factors that particularly induce
an entrepreneur to undertake process R&D investments. We follow Qiu (1997) and
decompose the consequences of process R&D investments in four parts. Using an
entrepreneur’s profit definition based on equation (4.10) or (4.11), after some algebraic
manipulations evaluated at the equilibrium on the first stage of the game37, for the
i-th entrepreneur, i 6= j, we arrive at
∂pii(·)
∂χi
=
∂pii(·)o
∂qj
∂qj
∂χi
+
∂pii(·)o
∂χi
− ∂Ri(·)
∂χi
=
(
1
Ξ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
2c(ρ− ξ)
9
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 as ρ>ξ
ϑ

(
∂2pij(·)
∂qi∂qj
∂pii(·)
∂qj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ste<0
+
(
−∂
2pii(·)
∂q2i
∂(·)pii
∂qj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
spe<0
+
∂pii(·)o
∂χi︸ ︷︷ ︸
sie>0
−∂Ri(·)
∂χi︸ ︷︷ ︸
coe<0
, (4.21)
with i = {g, b} and i 6= j. ϑ = 1I [i=h] − 1I [i=b], with I [·] represents an indicator func-
tion. Moreover, with respect to proposition 2, we have shown that
(
∂2pii(·)
∂q2i
∂2pij(·)
∂q2j
)
−(
∂2pii(·)
∂qi∂qj
∂2pij(·)
∂qj∂qi
)
= − c2(8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)−9)(8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)+9)
1458
≡ Ξ > 0. From equation (4.21) we
can directly infer that first, increasing an entrepreneur’s process R&D activity directly
reduces the production cost, and hence, for a given cost reduction potential, directly
increases the entrepreneur’s operating profits. Thus, the size effect of process R&D,
sie, is always positive38. Second, increasing own process R&D directly increases the
rival’s cost. Obviously, this is detrimental for conducting own process R&D endeavors.
Hence, the spillover effect, spe, is negative. Third, decreasing own production costs
directly affects the rival’s price and environmental quality output decision: Increasing
χi encourages the j-th rival to be tougher in the market and hence increases his prof-
its at the expense of the process R&D conducting entrepreneur. This again reflects
the strategic complementarities in product prices as well as in product environmental
quality, and as a direct consequence, the strategic effect, ste turns out to be negative.
Finally, R&D activities are costly, which implies that the cost effect coe is clearly nega-
tive. In a nutshell, by decomposing R&D incentives, we finally confirm our conjectures
accomplished in section 4.1 and 4.2. We now turn to the welfare-implications of the
unregulated economy.
37Refer to appendix A.5 for the derivation of expression (4.21).
38Please note that the size effect for both entrepreneurs is strictly positive as χg ∈(
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
)
with ρ > ξ.
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4.5 Welfare
Given products have been sold at prices given by equations (4.2) and (4.3), with equi-
librium quantities denoted by equations (4.4) and (4.5), and both evaluated at optimal
R&D outcomes represented by (4.12), the unregulated economy’s welfareWu is defined
as
Wu ≡
∫ θ˘
θ¯−1
[Ub(θ)df(θ)] +
∫ θ¯
θ˘
[Ug(θ)df(θ)] +
∑
i
pii −Θ(E), (4.22)
with Θ ≡ δΨ and Ψ ≡ Σi[(e − ei)xi] as the total emission level defined in equation
(3.3). δ is a positive parameter which weights the importance of environmental quality
for the society.
Equation (4.22) can be further re-expressed as:
Wu = 1
96
[
48θ¯
(
θ¯ + 2δ − 1)− 96δe¯− 48δ + 64 (ρ2 − ξ2)+ 3] . (4.23)
Proposition 3 From equation (4.23) we can directly infer that society’s welfare in-
creases by increasing the efficiency of process R&D activities ρ, whereas increasing
knowledge-spillover effects (ξ) decreases welfare. Given ρ = ξ, welfare remains unaf-
fected by varying ξ or ρ. Further, a higher emission level e¯ decreases welfare by δ > 0.
Proof: Referring to equation (4.23), taking partial derivatives of Wu with respect to
ρ, ξ and e¯, we finally arrive at: ∂W
u
∂ρ
= 4ρ
3
> 0, ∂W
u
∂ξ
= −4ξ
3
< 0 and ∂W
u
∂e¯
= −δ < 0. 
5 The first-best optimum
In this section, our aim is to determine the social optimal policy in the presence of
process R&D investments. To achive this goal, we follow Cremer and Thisse (1999),
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Bre´card (2012), and derive the first-best optimum of an
economy. A first-best optimum of an economy is realized, if, first, the social marginal
cost of production equals the marginal benefit of consumption. Additionally, the so-
ciety’s consumers have to be optimally allocated between the offered qualities. This
requires that the environmental consciousness parameter θ is chosen socially optimal,
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that is, it represents the marginal consumer who is exactly indifferent to purchasing
the green or brown environmental quality product, both offered at marginal costs.
The optimal prices in the social planner’s economy reflect the marginal costs of pro-
duction, the marginal environmental damage as well as the costs conducting process
R&D activities net the marginal benefits of process R&D activities. Accordingly, the
optimal prices are then given by39:
pog = 0.5q
2
l +
χ2b
2
+ δ (e¯− ql)− ξχg − ρχb (5.1)
pob = 0.5q
2
h +
χ2g
2
+ δ (e¯− qh)− ρχg − ξχb. (5.2)
Further, the optimal environmental consciousness parameter at which the represen-
tative consumer is indifferent consuming a green or brown quality product θ˘o reads
as
θ˘o =
pog − pob
qg − qb . (5.3)
The social optimal product differentiation level (qog − qob ), as well as the levels of opti-
mal process R&D outcomes χob and χ
o
g can be obtained by solving the social planer’s
problem:
maxqob ,qog ,χob ,χog
{∫ θ˘o
θ¯−1
[θqob − pob)dθ] +
∫ θ¯
θ˘o
[θqog − pog)dθ]
}
. (5.4)
Employing equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) together with (5.4), the social optimal en-
vironmental product qualities read as:
qo∗g =
1
4
(
4θ¯ + 4δ + 4 (χg − χb) (χg + χb + 2ξ − 2ρ)− 1
)
(5.5)
qo∗b =
1
4
(
4θ¯ + 4δ + 4 (χg − χb) (χg + χb + 2ξ − 2ρ)− 3
)
. (5.6)
39Please note that the superscript o in this section stands for optimal.
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Based on (5.4), taking the first-order derivatives with respect to χob and χ
o
g, the optimal
levels of the process R&D outcome are identical for both entrepreneurs and read as:
χo∗i = ρ+ ξ, for i 6= j. (5.7)
Employing equations (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7), we directly observe the ex-ante expected
result that the social optimal product differentiation level (qog − qob ) = 12c is lower
compared to the unregulated solution ((q∗g − q∗b ) = 32c) derived before. For the social-
optimal environmental consciousness parameter we calculate θ˘o = −0.5 + θ¯ which
obviously equals θ˘ represented by equation (4.19). The latter finding motivates the
following result.
Result 1 The unregulated equilibrium guarantees the optimal allocation of consumers
across the environmental quality space.
Based on equation (5.7) we can directly deduce the following insightful result:
Result 2 The social optimal process R&D outcomes are higher compared to those for
the unregulated economy as (χo∗i − χ∗i ) = 13(5ξ + ρ) > 0, for i 6= j.
This second result can be entirely understood in terms of the internalization of the
knowledge-spillover effect. The social planer obviously internalizes this effect, whereas
the decentralized and unregulated solution does not. Hence, the decentralized and
unregulated solution shows a myopic behavior of the economy’s entrepreneurs: As
argued above, the existence of the spillover-effect which is reinforced by the negative
strategic-effect generates the incentive for underinvestment in process R&D.
Employing equation (5.4) together with equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7)
the social optimal welfare can be therefore calculated as:
Wo = −32cδe¯+ 16θ¯
(
θ¯ + 2δ − 1)+ 16c(ξ + ρ)2 + 16(δ − 1)δ + 5
32c
. (5.8)
We therefore establish the following proposition:
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Result 3 The first-best optimal welfare is higher compared to the welfare at the unreg-
ulated equilibrium.
This can be traced back to two reasons: First, in contrast to the unregulated equi-
librium, the first-best optimum takes the knowledge-spillovers appropriately into ac-
count, and, thus increases welfare as can be directly seen from consulting equation
(5.4). Second, as mentioned by Bre´card (2012), the overall socially optimal pollution
level Θo is lower compared to the unregulated equilibrium: (Θ − Θo) =
(
2ce¯−2θ¯+1
2c
)
−(
2ce¯−2θ¯−2δ+1
2c
)
= δ
c
> 0.
6 Optimal taxation and second-best solution
We now proceed by discussing the regulated economy. Referring to Result 1, we know
that the unregulated equilibrium deduced in section 4 of this contribution guarantees
an optimal allocation of consumers across the quality space. As a direct consequence
of that we only need three fiscal instruments inducing a first-best solution. The set of
fiscal instruments is designed to, (i) correct for the entrepreneur’s market power, (ii)
to correct for the negative pollution externality, and, (iii) to correct for the knowledge-
spillover externality induced by process R&D investments.
We draw on the framework proposed by Lambertini and Orsini (2005), Lombardini-
Riipinen (2005) and Bre´card (2012) and introduce, first, a product tax τ˜v designed as
an ad-valorem tax which, as we will observe, directly decreases product differentiation.
Second, as product quality tends to decrease by the product tax, we envisage further an
emission tax τe ∈ [0,∞+). Third, we introduce a subsidy scheme with a corresponding
subsidy rate τs ∈ (0, 1) to foster the incentive to increase an entrepreneur’s own process
R&D. Hence, the subsidy scheme works against the incentive to reduce own process
R&D caused by the knowledge-spillover externality.
As the demand side is obviously not affected by the envisaged set of fiscal policies,
based on equation (4.1), we proceed by introducing the adjusted operating profits of
both entrepreneurs. With the set of fiscal policies, they now read as40:
piori (pi, qi, χi, χj) =
40The superscript r stands for regulated and o for operating.
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[1− τ˜v]
[
pi − ci(qi)
1− τ˜v +
(
ρ
1− τ˜v
)
χi +
(
ξ
1− τ˜v
)
χj −
(
τe
1− τ˜v
)
(e¯− qi)
]
ni, (6.1)
with i 6= j and τv ≡
(
1
1−τ˜v
)
defined over τv ∈ [1,∞+[ as a corresponding ad-valorem
index suggested by Cremer and Thisse (1994). Of course, the subsidy rate does not
affect entrepreneur’s operating-profits and hence operating profit maximization.
Now, we follow the same steps as proposed in section 4 to solve the three-stage game.
To conserve space, we focus on the sub-game perfect equilibria on the second and first
stage. Based on the profit functions given by equation (6.1), we show in appendix
A.6 that only one set of quality pairs fulfill the second-order conditions and, moreover,
ensure positive profits. This pair of qualities, which ensures a stable, interior solution
is given by
q∗rg =
12θ¯ + 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb) + 12τeτv + 3
12cτv
(6.2)
q∗rb =
12θ¯ + 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb) + 12τeτv − 15
12cτv
. (6.3)
From equations (6.2) and (6.3) we directly observe a trade-off between a higher envi-
ronmental product quality and a reduction of product differentiation: product quality
is increased by the imposed environmental tax while the ad-valorem tax alone tends
to decrease economy’s environmental quality by decreasing product differentiation:
(q∗rg − q∗rb ) = 32cτv . This result is in line with Cremer and Thisse (1994) and identical
to those derived by Bre´card (2012) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005).
Accordingly, the demand for the green and brown products, nrg and n
r
b respectively,
can be derived as:
n∗rg =
1
18
(
9− 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb)
)
(6.4)
n∗rb =
1
18
(
9 + 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb)
)
. (6.5)
It is rather obvious that increasing the ad-valorem tax tends to stimulate the demand
of the green quality at the expense of the brown quality, given the R&D outcome of
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the high-quality producing entrepreneur exceeds the R&D efforts of its competitor,
χg > χb and given ρ > ξ holds per assumption. Given χg = χb the market is equally
shared between both entrepreneurs: n∗g = n
∗
b = 0.5.
Referring to equations (6.2), (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5), the entrepreneurs’ operating profits
on the second stage changes to:
pior∗g =
(9− 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb)) 2
216cτ 2v
=
18
216cτ 2v
(n∗rg )
2 (6.6)
pior∗b =
(9 + 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb)) 2
216cτ 2v
=
18
216cτ 2v
(1− n∗rg )2. (6.7)
Given χg 6= χb, the regulated operating-profits of both entrepreneurs solely depends
on the ad-valorem tax τv: Increasing τv directly decreases the high-quality operating
profits in favour of the low-quality operating profits, given χg < χb, and vice versa
41.
Additionally, from equations (6.6) and (6.7) we directly observe that the operating-
profits are not affected by the regulator’s imposed emission tax τe.
The solution of the first stage of the game delivers the optimal process R&D outcome
for the regulated economy. As we have concluded in section 5 by establishing the
second result, the optimal level of process R&D outcome resulting for the unregulated
economy is too low compared to the social optimal solution. Hence, we impose that
the regulator has to subsidize the level of process R&D activities with a subsidy rate
τs ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the optimization problem defined by the equations (4.8) and (4.9)
net the R&D costs given by equation (3.5) has to be adjusted accordingly. The profits
change to:
pirg =
(9− 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb)) 2
216cτ 2v
− 1
2
χ2g (1− τs) (6.8)
pirb =
(9 + 8c(ξ − ρ)τ 2v (χg − χb)) 2
216cτ 2v
− 1
2
χ2b (1− τs) . (6.9)
Maximization of equations (6.8) and (6.9) with respect to χg and χb results in the Nash-
equilibrium regarding the regulated entrepreneurs’ R&D outcomes which are given by:
41This can be seen as follows:
∂pior∗g
∂τv
=
∂pior∗g
∂n∗rg
∂nr∗g
∂τv
, which is negative, given
∂nr∗g
∂τv
< 0. To be true,
the latter requires χg < χb with ρ > ξ.
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χ∗ri =
2(ρ− ξ)
3 (1− τs) for i 6= j. (6.10)
It is straightforward to observe from equation (6.10) that ceteris paribus the regulated
R&D outcome is increasing in the subsidy-rate τs for both products and is higher
compared to the unregulated solution represented with equation (4.12), given τs ∈
(0, 1).
The second-order conditions which are more restrictive due to the existence of the
subsidy-rate τs compared to the unregulated equilibrium now require:
16
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c(ξ − ρ)2 + τs < 1 for i 6= j. (6.11)
Proposition 4 The regulated economy’s process equilibrium process R&D outcome
which is represented by equation (6.10) is a unique and stable interior solution.
Proof. See appendix A.5 
As stated above, the simultaneous implementation of the fiscal policy menu consisting
of the ad-valorem tax τv, the emission tax τe and the subsidy-rate τs will induce the
first-best solution derived in section 2. Technically spoken, we have to solve a three-
dimensional system of equations consisting of both entrepreneurs’ R&D outcomes and
environmental quality-levels42. The unique solution to this problem is presented in the
next proposition.
Proposition 5 The implementation of the fiscal menu (τ os , τ
o
e , τ
o
v ) induces a first-best
optimum, given the absence of administrative costs. The menu as the single solution of
a three-dimensional system of equations qoi = q
∗r
i and ξ
o
i = ξ
∗r
i for i = {g, b} and i 6= j
can be characterized as follows:
(τ os , τ
o
e , τ
o
v ) =
(
5ξ + ρ
3(ξ + ρ)
,
2θ¯
3
+ δ − 1
3
, 3
)
. (6.12)
42As the sub-game equilibrium R&D outcome is the same for both entrepreneurs, the system reduces
from dimension four to three.
26
Referring to the relevant literature we find that both, the optimal ad-valorem tax index
τv = 3 or the optimal ad-valorem tax τ˜v =
2
3
, as well as the optimal environmental
tax τe = δ+
2
3
(
θ¯ − 1
2
)
is the same as those derived by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and
Bre´card (2012). However, this result is not remarkable as the parameters ρ and ξ which
are directly linked to each entrepreneur’s process R&D activities do not affect either
the entrepreneur’s product differentiation nor the level of emissions. Thus, apart from
the first stage of the game, the model presented in this contribution can be viewed
as isomorph to those models presented by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and Bre´card
(2012).
The optimal process R&D subsidy rate τ os obviously decreases with the R&D produc-
tivity parameter ρ and increases with the knowledge-spillover parameter ξ. Hence, the
process R&D subsidy policy tends to reduce the incentives for under-investment in
process R&D induced by the spillover effect and reinforced by strategic effect derived
in section 4.4.
In contrast to the welfare definition for the unregulated economy denoted by Wu in
equation (4.22), for the case of the regulated economy discussed in this section, we
have to acknowledge the governmental fiscal budget Ψ(E,χi, χj) which is defined as
the revenues coming from the emission tax based on the regulated emission level E∗r net
the expenditures for the entrepreneur’s process R&D subsidies. Hence, the regulated
welfare Wr has to be defined as
Wr ≡
∫ θ˘
θ¯−1
[Ub(θ)df(θ)] +
∫ θ¯
θ˘
[Ug(θ)df(θ)] +
∑
i
pii −Θ(E) + Ψ(E,χi, χj), (6.13)
with Ψ(E, ξi, ξj) ≡ τeE∗r −
∑
i τs
χ2i
2
for i 6= j.
Using the optimal levels of process R&D outcome represented by equation (6.10), the
optimal prices43 and quantities given by equations (6.2) and (6.3), respectively, and the
optimal level of demanded green and brown product qualities represented by equations
(6.4) and (6.5), respectively, the regulated welfare Wr can be re-expressed as:
Wr =
−16τ 2v
(
2ce¯ (δ − τe) + τe
(−2θ¯ − 2δ + 2τe + 1)+ 8c(ξ−ρ)2τs9(τs−1)2 )
32cτ 2v
+
43The optimal prices for the regulated economy are read as
prg =
9(16τ2v(2ce¯τe−cχg(ξ+ρ)−τ2e )+25)+8(3θ¯(8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v (χg−χb)+3)+18θ¯2+2cτ2v(4c(ξ−ρ)2τ2v (χg−χb)2−9χb(ξ+ρ)))
288cτv
and prb =
48τ2v(6ce¯τe+cχg(ρ−7ξ)−3τ2e )+8(3θ¯(8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v (χg−χb)−15)+18θ¯2+2cτ2v(4c(ξ−ρ)2τ2v (χg−χb)2+3χb(ξ−7ρ)))+441
288cτv
.
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+
16τ3v
(
−2ce¯τe + 4c(ξ−ρ)(ξ+ρ)3(τs−1) + τ2e
)
+ τv
(
16θ¯
(
θ¯ + 2δ − 2τe − 1
)− 16δ + 16τe − 23)+ 24
32cτ2v
.
(6.14)
Theoretically, the agency can dispose of the entire toolbox of fiscal instruments. How-
ever, as pointed out by Baumol and Oates (1988), in reality, the environmental agency
is often restricted to use only a sub-set of the fiscal menu. Further, as some strands of
the political economy literature suggest, due to lobbying, the acceptance of a certain
policy directive may hinder the initialization of a first-best optimum44. This brings us
to think about the initialization of a second-best solution, which we should compare
with the unregulated solution instead of comparing the first-best solution given by
equation (6.14) with the unregulated solution.
7 Second-best welfare
This section deals with the discussion of an implementation of a second-best solution
by the environmental agency. Given we ignore the ad-valorem-tax, which tends to
increase the economy-wide emission level given by Er = 2τv(ce¯−τe)−2θ¯+1
2cτv
45, and hence,
should not be seen as a suitable instrument46 to tackle environmental problems and
working towards sustainability. Contrary to the ad-valorem tax, the process R&D
subsidy policy obviously does not directly affect the environmental emission level, but
affects environmental product quality and potentially could increase welfare47. Thus,
for the environmental agency, we may conjecture that it seems ex-ante attractive to
use both instruments to implement an appropriate environmental fiscal policy scheme.
Consequently, the question arises what the regulator’s second-best policy is, assuming
the authority is empowered to set only the environmental tax and/or the process R&D
44Refer to Aidt (1998) for instance.
45This can be seen as follows: The first-order derivative of E(·)r with respect to τv is pos-
itive for sufficiently large θ¯: ∂E(·)∂τv =
2θ¯−1
2cτ2v
. Assuming full market coverage, the derivative
is clearly positive as appendix A.8 shows that full market coverage is guaranteed, given θ¯ ≥
1
4
√
640τ2v (3e¯τe(τs−1)−2(ξ−ρ)(ξ+ρ))
3(τs−1) + 25− τeτv + 1.
46See Bre´card (2008), Bre´card (2012) and Lambertini and Orsini (2005).
47Based on equation (6.14), we observe that welfare is increasing, given τs < 1 +
4(ξ−ρ)
2(ρ−ξ)+3(ξ+ρ)τv for
ρ > ξ.
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subsidy-rate. The following subsections are directly devoted to a discussion regard-
ing the welfare implications by employing different combinations of fiscal instruments
available from the regulator’s toolbox.
7.1 Second-best welfare with pollution tax τe
If the regulator is only empowered to set the environmental pollution tax τe, welfare
defined by equation (6.14) changes to:
Wr1 =Wu + τe (2δ − τe)
2c
. (7.1)
The solution to the regulator’s game, maximizing welfare given by equation (7.1), is to
set δ, which is the society’s valuation of pollution level, equal to the emission tax τe.
As Θ ≡ δΨ, δ can be alternatively interpreted as the marginal environmental damage.
This motivates the following result.
Result 4 Given the absence of administrative costs, welfare Wr1 is increasing, given
τe < δ. Further, the second-best emission-tax τ˜e equals the Pigouvian tax rate δ as the
single solution of the regulator’s game.
Prima facie, the results seem to be at odds with the prevailing literature, as under
perfect competition the optimal tax should be equal the marginal damage, whereas
under imperfect competition the authority reduces the tax below this given threshold48.
However, this result is in line with the findings of Bre´card (2012) and Lombardini-
Riipinen (2005) and can be explained through the assumptions that (i) a consumer
buys one unit of quality or nothing, (ii) the market is fully covered49 and, ceteris-
paribus, (iii) environmental product quality strictly increases production costs despite
the existence of process R&D. If these assumptions are fulfilled, then a lump-sum tax
is equivalent to a uniform commodity tax, as noted by Bre´card (2008). This establishes
the fourth result.
Further, the emission-tax τe neither affect the entrepreneur’s operating-profits nor im-
pacts product differentiation at the regulated equilibrium.
48Refer to Requate (2007) for a recent survey.
49Refer to appendix A.8.
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7.2 Second-best welfare with process R&D τs
As mentioned above, the process R&D subsidy only affects the profits but not the
operating-profits of the entrepreneurs. Further, it does not affect product differentia-
tion at the regulated equilibrium. Given, the regulator can only use the R&D subsidy
fiscal instrument, welfare defined by equation (6.14) reduces to:
Wr2 =Wu + 2(ξ − ρ)τs (−5ξ − ρ+ 3(ξ + ρ)τs)
9 (τs − 1) 2 . (7.2)
Obviously, welfare is increasing in the subsidy rate τs beyond the welfare which results
for the unregulated economy, given τs <
5ξ+ρ
3(ξ+ρ)
= τ os as ρ > ξ. Now, based on the
first order-condition of the regulator’s game, we finally arrive at the single solution
τ˜s =
5ξ+ρ
ξ+5ρ
< τ os as ρ > ξ. This leads to the following result:
Result 5 Given the absence of administrative costs, the second-best subsidy-rate τ˜s <
τ os ensures that Wr2 >Wu. Further, Wr2 is strictly increasing in τs ∈ (0, τ˜s).
This result has the important policy implication that, given the absence of any further
policy instruments, setting the subsidy-rate within the optimal interval defined as τs ∈
(0, τ os ] always ensures that ∆Wr2 ≡ Wr2 −Wu > 0.
7.3 Second-best welfare with pollution tax τe and process R&D τs
Finally, we discuss the welfare-implications for employing both fiscal instruments, the
pollution tax and the process R&D subvention scheme. We can re-express the social
optimal welfare Wo as
Wo =Wr + 4c(ξ + ρ)
2 + 4δ2 + 4τe (τe − 2δ) + 1
8c
+
4(ξ − ρ)2
9 (τs − 1) 2 −
2(ξ + 5ρ)(ξ − ρ)
9 (τs − 1) ,
(7.3)
which directly motivates the following result:
Result 6 The combination of both instruments affects the economy’s welfare in a
positive way but it fails to establish the first-best-optimum.
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Proof. From equation (7.3) we can directly observe that the welfare-difference defined
as ∆W ≡ Wo − Wr is a decreasing function in the arguments τe, given δ > τe and
τs >
5ξ+ρ
ξ+5ρ
as ρ > ξ. Irrespective of the regulator’s chosen value of τe
50, ∆W ≡Wo−Wr
based on equation (7.3) exhibits a unique minimum at τ˜s for τs ∈ (0, 1). Although,
Wr12 is higher compared to Wr1 51 and to Wr2 for reasonable parameter-values52, the
first-best optimum Wo cannot be reached. Given τe = δ, the second-best subsidy-rate
τ˜s < τs, with
τs ≡
√
(−20cξ2+16cξρ+4cρ2+36δτe−18τ2e )2−4(9τ2e−18δτe)(12cξ2−12cρ2−18δτe+9τ2e )+20cξ2−16cξρ−4cρ2−36δτe+18τ2e
2(12cξ2−12cρ2−18δτe+9τ2e )
ensures that Wr12 >Wu.
7.4 Efficiency of process R&D subsidy policy
Based on the results derived in the following sections, we can conjecture that given
the regulator sets the Pigouvian tax, welfare-outcome crucially depends on the chosen
process R&D subsidy rate τs, given this additional instrument is available. Based on
the derived fifth result of this contribution, we directly deduce that Wr2 is strictly
increasing given τs ∈ (0, τ˜s). Further, we can observe that Wr1 is strictly higher
compared to Wr2 given either the regulator sets τs ∈ (0, τ˜s) with
τ˜s ≡ −
√
(−20cξ2+16cξρ+4cρ2+36δτe−18τ2e )2−4(9τ2e−18δτe)(12cξ2−12cρ2−18δτe+9τ2e )+20cξ2−16cξρ−4cρ2−36δτe+18τ2e
2(12cξ2−12cρ2−18δτe+9τ2e ) ,
or the regulator decides to choose τs ∈ (τ˜s, τs). Hence, setting τs ∈ (τ os , 1) directly re-
sults in a welfare-loss Wr12 −Wr1 < 0 compared to a policy where the authority only
decides over the environmental tax τe. Hence, this model contributes to the literature
regarding the efficiency of R&D policy programs.
Figure 7.1 graphically confirms the previously derived results53. The gray shaded areas
reflect the welfare-gains employing an efficient R&D subsidy policy with or without
50Inserting τs =
5ξ+ρ
ξ+5ρ in equation (7.3) leads to ∆W =
2c(17ξ2+26ξρ−7ρ2)+36δ2+36τe(τe−2δ)+9
72c which
is positive for all τe ∈ (0,∞+) and realizes a global minimum at τe = δ.
51This argument can be shown as follows. Define ∆Wr12r1 ≡ Wr12 − Wr1 =
2(ξ−ρ)τs(−5ξ−ρ+3(ξ+ρ)τs)
9(τs−1)2 , which is strictly positive, given τs ∈ (0; τos ) and ρ > ξ per assumption.
52This second argument can be shown as follows. Define ∆Wr12r2 ≡ Wr12−Wr2 = τe(2δ−τe)2c , which
is strictly positive, given τe < 2δ and ρ > ξ per assumption. Given the second-best environmental tax
δ = τe, we finally arrive at Wr12 −Wr2 = δ22c > 0.
53The following parameter values have been used to construct figure 4.1: δ = 0.2, c = 1.0, e¯ = 3.0,
θ¯ = 5.0, ξ = 0.1, ρ = 0.7 and τe = δ.
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Figure 7.1: Environmental policy evaluation
imposing the optimal environmental tax policy, which consists of setting the Pigouvian
tax. Obviously, in terms of welfare-gains, introducing a policy which is based on
imposing solely the Pigouvian tax outperforms a process R&D subsidy policy, given
the R&D subsidy-rate is set below τs or is set beyond τs. The combination of both
instruments is always welfare-increasing compared to the unregulated solution, given
the subsidy-rate does not exceed the social-optimal process R&D subsidy rate τ os .
8 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a novel framework discussing the interplay of process R&D
activities, the price and environmental quality setting of heterogeneous entrepreneurs
in a market where consumers feel up to paying for environmental’s quality of a vertically
differentiated good. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this kind of
an undoubtedly, highly-policy relevant interplay is discussed thoroughly in the context
of the strategic industrial organization literature.
By solving for the unregulated and decentralized equilibrium, we decompose an en-
trepreneur’s incentive conducting process R&D in four parts. In particular we show
that an entrepreneur’s incentive of conducting own process R&D, which reduces pro-
duction costs and hence increases welfare, is reduced due to the existence of knowledge-
spillovers. Moreover, due to the strategic complementarities, both in prices as well as
in environmental quality, a strategic effect reinforces the negative consequences of the
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spillover-effect. In particular we show that this negative knowledge-spillover exter-
nality is internalized by the social planer. Consequently, the question arises which
fiscal-policy-mix is optimal in order to establish a first-best solution.
We have identified that a mix of an ad-valorem tax, an imposed emission tax and
an appropriate R&D subsidy scheme establishes the first-best-solution. However, as
in reality only a sub-set of (appropriate) policy instruments is available, we further
thoroughly discuss the implementation of a second-best solution. After demonstrating
that the ad-valorem tax in general reduces environmental quality, in the following we
directly focus on a second-best solution consisting of a combination of the emission tax
and the R&D subsidy scheme or relying either only on the R&D subsidy-scheme or on
the emission tax. We find that the second-best solution consisting of a combination
of the emission tax and the R&D subsidy-scheme is, compared to the unregulated
solution, welfare-increasing but fails to establish the first-best optimum. We further
address the question whether a R&D subsidy policy is unconditionally efficient with
respect to welfare-gains. We find that this is not the case by identifying a parameter-
space for the subsidy-rate which guarantees welfare-gains by increasing the process
R&D subsidy-rate, given the environmental tax is equal to the Pigouvian tax.
Even if our model has the merit to offer an analytical solution of the imposed three-
step game from which we can derive several implications for environmental policy
interventions, however it first defines the starting-point for several further research
projects in this direction. In order to extend this paper’s analysis, it may be useful to
expand the model by simultaneously discussing the interplay of both product as well as
process R&D activities. For instance, in contrast to our model, the existence of R&D
in environmental product quality may directly affect product differentiation. In this
context, it may be also useful to introduce uncertainty with respect to the product and
process R&D activities. Further, it may be interesting to generalize the model for the
case of an uncovered market. In a nutshell, it seems that a generalization of this setup
requires simulation methods, as an analytical solution cannot be guaranteed.
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9 Appendix
A.1 Proof of the sub-game quality equilibrium for the unregulated economy
In section 4.2. we have mentioned that only one quality vector (qg, qb) fulfills the
second-order conditions and further guarantees a positive operating-profit for each
entrepreneur. The solution of the system of two equations and degree two in produced
quality levels qg > qb, which is based on equation (4.1) with
∂pii(qi,qj ,χi,χj)
∂qi
|(p∗i ,p∗j ) = 0 for
i = {b, g} and i 6= j produces five pairs of potential quality vector equilibria. Now it
is easy to show that only one solution denoted by (q∗g , q
∗
b ) generates positive operating
profits for both entrepreneurs. This solution is represented with equations (4.4) and
(4.5).
Lemma 1 . The single solution (q∗g , q
∗
b ) fulfills the second-order conditions:
∂2pig(pg, qg, χg, χb)
∂q2g
|(q∗g ,q∗b ) =
1
972
c (8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb)− 9) (8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb) + 27) ≤ 0
∂2pib(pg, qg, χg, χb)
∂q2b
|(q∗g ,q∗b ) =
1
972
c (8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb)− 27) (8c(ξ − ρ) (χg − χb) + 9) ≤ 0,
Proof. Given χg ∈
[
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
]
, for ρ > ξ, i = {g, b} with i 6= j, the
second-order conditions are fulfilled. 
Further, the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition evaluated at the equilibrium (q∗g , q
∗
b ) is
satisfied, given
(
∂2pii(·)
∂q2i
∂2pij(·)
∂q2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)
∂qi∂qj
∂2pij(·)
∂qj∂χi
)
= − c2(8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)−9)(8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)+9)
1458
≡
Ξ > 0. The latter argument can be shown as follows: First, note that Ξ is strictly
globally concave. It is increasing in the interval χg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb, χb
)
. At χg = χb it
reaches a global maximum. For χg ∈
(
χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
)
, Ξ is strictly decreasing. For
χg =
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ)
)
+χb and χg =
(
9
8c(ρ−ξ)
)
+χb, respectively, Ξ turns out to be zero. Hence,
the equilibrium (q∗g , q
∗
b ) represented with equations (4.4) and (4.5) offers a unique and
stable interior solution for χg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
)
. As can be seen further,
∂2pig(pg ,qg ,χg ,χb)
∂q2g
|(q∗g ,q∗b ) =
∂2pib(pg ,qg ,χg ,χb)
∂q2b
|(q∗g ,q∗b ) for χg = χb.
Moreover, the equilibrium represented by (q∗g , q
∗
b ) has to fulfill the non-deviation con-
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ditions indeed being a Nash-equilibrium. These are given as:
piog(q
∗
g , q
∗
b ) ≥ piog(qg, q∗b ), for qg ∈ [0, e¯] (9.1)
piob (q
∗
g , q
∗
b ) ≥ piog(q∗g , qb), for qg ∈ [0, e¯]. (9.2)
First, we focus on equation (9.1). We notice that piog(qg, q
∗
b ) is strictly positive, given
ng(qg, q
∗
b ) ∈ (0, 1]. Now let us define qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=1 = 2θ¯−12c and further qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=0 =
−
√
c2(8c(ξ−ρ)(χb−χg)+9)−2c(θ¯+1)
2c2
, both representing a corner solution each.
Given qg ∈ (qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=1; qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=0), piog(qg, q∗b ) exhibits a global maximum at q∗g ∈
(q
g
|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=1; qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=0). The latter argument is true as qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=1 < q∗g < qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=0
with q∗g =
12θ¯+8c(ξ−ρ)(χg−χb)+3
12c
and χg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ) + χb;
9
8c(ρ−ξ) + χb
)
.
Hence, ng(q
∗
g , q
∗
b ) ∈ (0, 1). Now, for qg ∈ (qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=0);∞+), it directly follows that
ng(qg, q
∗
b ) < 0. Moreover, for qg ∈ (0; qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=1), we obtain ng > 1. Finally, with
qg ∈ (qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=1; qg|ng(q∗g ,q∗b )=0) ≤ e¯, we can deduce that piog(q∗g , q∗b ) ≥ piog(qg, q∗b ).
Second, we turn to equation (9.2). As the same arguments hold for the brown quality
producing entrepreneur, we skip the proof.
As shown in chapter 3.2, inserting equations (4.4) and (4.5) in the operating profits
functions represented by equation (4.1) results in positive operating profits for both
entrepreneurs, given by equations (4.8) and (4.9). 
Thus, the equilibrium (q∗g , q
∗
b ) represented by equations (4.4) and (4.5) is indeed a stable,
interior solution, which fulfills the non-deviation conditions for both entrepreneurs.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
The equilibrium given by equation (4.12) offers a unique and stable interior solution, if
it meets three conditions listed in proposition 2. We prove the conditions sequentially.
Condition 1: The second-order conditions for profit maximization represented by
equation (4.13) are fulfilled.
Proof : It is straightforward to show that the second order conditions represented
by equation (4.13) are fulfilled, if we assume that ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
4
√
c
)
and ρ > ξ per
assumption. 
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Condition 2: The Routh-Hurwitz stability condition which requires(
∂2pii(·)
∂χ2i
∂2pij(·)
∂χ2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)
∂χi∂χj
∂2pij(·)
∂χj∂χi
)
> 0. (9.3)
Proof : After conducting some algebraic manipulations by employing equations
(4.10) and (4.11), the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition can be rewritten as
1
27
[27− 32(ξ − ρ)2] which is strictly positive, given ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
4
√
c
)
and ρ > ξ
per assumption. 
Condition 3: The R&D outcomes are strictly positive, that is, χi > 0 for i 6= j.
Proof : From equation (4.12) we can directly deduce that χi > 0 for i 6= j, given
ρ > ξ per assumption. 
A.3 Proof of the non-deviation conditions for the unregulated economy’s
process R&D sub-game equilibrium
For the unregulated economy, please set τv = 1 and τs = 0. Further set pi
r
i (·) = pii(·),
pi∗ri (·) = pi∗i (·), χri = χi and χr∗i = χ∗i for i = {g, b} and i 6= j. Then follow the proof
given in A.4.
A.4 Proof of the non-deviation conditions for the regulated economy’s pro-
cess R&D sub-game equilibrium
The equilibrium represented by (χ∗g, χ
∗
b) has to fulfill the non-deviation conditions.
These conditions are given as:
pirg(χ
∗r
g , χ
∗r
b ) ≥ pig(χrg, χ∗rb ), for χrg ≥ 0 (9.4)
pirb(χ
∗r
g , χ
∗r
b ) ≥ pig(χ∗rg , χrb), for χrb ≥ 0. (9.5)
First, we focus on equation (9.4) and further make use of the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. pirg(χ
r∗
g , χ
r∗
b ) is strictly positive for ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
(1−τs)
4
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
)
.
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Proof. We notice that pig(χ
r∗
g , χ
r∗
b ) is strictly positive with pig(χ
r∗
g , χ
r∗
b ) =
3
8cτ2v
+ 2(ξ−ρ)
2
9(τs−1) ,
given the operating-profit pior(·) = 3
8cτ2v
exceeds 2(ξ−ρ)
2
9(τs−1) < 0. Now pi
or(·) > 2(ξ−ρ)2
9(τs−1) , given
ρ ∈
(
0, 3
√
3(1−τs)
4
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
)
. Appendix A.6 tells that the equilibrium represented by equation
(6.10) is a unique and interior solution, given ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
(1−τs)
4
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
)
. As the upper limit
3
√
3(1−τs)
4
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
exceeds the upper limit
3
√
3
2
(1−τs)
4
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
as
3
√
3(2−
√
2)(1−τs)
8
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
> 0, we straightfor-
wardly conclude that pirg(χ
r∗
g , χ
r∗
b ) is strictly positive for ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
(1−τs)
4
√
c(1−τs)τ2v
)
. 
Now for χrg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v + χ
r
b;χ
r∗
g
)
, pirg(χ
r
g, χ
r∗
b ) is strictly increasing with χ
r
g. For χ
r
g ∈(
χr∗g ;
9
8c(ρ−ξ)τ2v + χb
)
, pirg(χ
r
g, χ
∗r
b ) is strictly decreasing with χ
r
g. For χ
r
g = χ
∗r
g , pi
r
g(χ
r
g, χ
∗r
b )
offers an unique global maximum with pirg(χ
r
g, χ
∗r
b )|χrg=χ∗rg = pirg(χr∗g , χr∗b ). 
Hence, the process R&D equilibrium outcome represented with equation (4.12) or
(6.10), respectively, fulfills the non-deviation conditions.
A.5. Decomposition of process R&D incentives for the unregulated economy
Differentiating the first-order conditions of the second stage of the game with respect
to χi, we obtain ∂2pioi∂q2i ∂2pioi∂qi∂qj
∂2pioj
∂qj∂qi
∂2pioj
∂q2j
( ∂qi∂χi
∂qj
∂χi
)
=
(
2
9
c(ξ − ρ)
2
9
c(ξ − ρ)
)
, (9.6)
for i 6= j. From this expression we directly calculate
∂qj
∂χi
=
 29c(ρ− ξ)(
∂2pii(·)
∂q2i
∂2pij(·)
∂q2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)
∂qi∂qj
∂2pij(·)
∂qj∂qi
)
( ∂2pioj
∂qj∂qi
− ∂
2pioi
∂q2i
)
, (9.7)
with
(
∂2pii(·)
∂q2i
∂2pij(·)
∂q2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)
∂qi∂qj
∂2pij(·)
∂qj∂qi
)
≡ Ξ > 0 as shown in A.1. Inserting equation (9.7)
in the first line of equation (4.21) results in the second line of equation (4.21). To
conserve space, we further introduce an indicator function ϑ = 1I [i=h] − 1I [i=b] to dif-
ferentiate between the green (ϑ = 1) and brown entrepreneur (ϑ = −1) with i = {g, b}
and i 6= j. 
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A.6 Proof of the sub-game quality equilibrium for the regulated economy
To prove that only one quality vector (qrg, q
r
b) fulfills the second-order conditions and
further guarantees a positive operating-profit for each entrepreneur for the regulated
economy, we follow the same steps as used for the proof of proposition 2 given in
appendix A.1.
Lemma 3. The solution of the two-dimensional system of degree two in the produced
environmental product quality, denoted as (q∗rg , q
∗r
b ), which is now derived from equation
(6.1), fulfills the the second order conditions:
∂2pirg(p
r
g, q
r
g , χ
r
g, χ
r
b)
∂qr2g
|(qr∗g ,qr∗b ) =
1
972
c
(
16c(ξ − ρ)τ2v
(
χrg − χrb
) (
4c(ξ − ρ)τ2v
(
χrg − χrb
)
+ 9
)− 243) ≤ 0
∂2pirb (p
r
g, q
r
g , χ
r
g, χ
r
b)
∂qr2b
|(qr∗g ,qr∗b ) =
1
972
c
(
16c(ξ − ρ)τ2v
(
χrg − χrb
) (
4c(ξ − ρ)τ2v
(
χrg − χrb
)− 9)− 243) ≤ 0,
Proof. Given χrg ∈
[
9
8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v + χ
r
b;
9
8c(ρ−ξ)τ2v + χ
r
b
]
, for ρ > ξ and i = {g, b} with i 6= j.
The Routh-Hurwitz stability condition evaluated at the regulated equilibrium (q∗rg , q
∗r
b )
is satisfied as
(
∂2pii(·)r
∂qr2i
∂2pij(·)r
∂qr2j
)
−
(
∂2pii(·)r
∂qri ∂q
r
j
∂2pij(·)
∂qrj ∂q
r
i
)
= − c
2(64c2(ξ−ρ)2τ4v(χrg−χrb)2−81)
1458
≡ Ξr > 0
for χrg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v + χbr ;
9
8c(ρ−ξ)τ2v + χ
r
b
)
with Ξr being strictly globally concave with
a global maximum realized at χrg = χ
r
b. Moreover, the equilibrium represented by
(q∗rg , q
∗r
b ) has to fulfill the non-deviation conditions. These are given as:
pirg(q
∗r
g , q
∗r
b ) ≥ pirg(qrg, q∗rb ), for qrg ∈ [0, e¯] (9.8)
pirb(q
∗r
g , q
∗r
b ) ≥ pirg(q∗rg , qrb), for qrg ∈ [0, e¯]. (9.9)
For nrg(q
r
g, q
∗r
b ) ∈ (0, 1], we observe that pirg(qrg, q∗rb ) is strictly positive. Let qg|nrg(qr∗g ,qr∗r )=1 =
2θ¯+2τeτv−1
2cτv
and qg|nrg(q∗g ,q∗b )=0 =
2cτv(θ¯+τeτv+1)+
√
c2τ2v (9−8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v (χg−χb))
2c2τ2v
both representing a
corner solution each.
Given qrg ∈ (qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=1; qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=0), pirg(qrg, q∗rb ) exhibits a global maximum at
q∗rg ∈ (qrg|nrg(q∗g ,q∗b )=1; qrg|nrg(q∗g ,q∗b )=0), as one can show that qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=1 < q∗rg < qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=0
with q∗rg =
12θ¯+8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v(χrg−χrb)+12τeτv+3
12cτv
and χrg ∈
(
9
8c(ξ−ρ)τ2v + χ
r
b;
9
8c(ρ−ξ)τ2v + χ
r
b
)
. Now,
for qrg ∈ (qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=0);∞+), it directly follows that nrg(qrg, q∗rb ) < 0. Moreover, for qrg ∈
(0; qr
g
|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=1), we obtain nrg > 1. Finally, with qrg ∈ (qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=1; qrg|nrg(q∗rg ,q∗rb )=0) ≤
e¯, we can deduce that pirg(q
∗r
g , q
∗r
b ) ≥ pirg(qrg, q∗rb ). Thus, the equilibrium represented by
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(q∗rg , q
∗r
b ) for the regulated economy establishes an interior solution with n
r
g(q
∗r
g , q
∗r
b ) ∈
(0, 1).
Second, we turn to equation (9.2). As the same arguments hold for the low quality
producing entrepreneur, we skip the proof.
Inserting equations (6.2) and (6.3) in the operating profits functions represented by
equation (6.1) results in positive operating profits for both entrepreneurs which are
now represented with equations (6.6) and (6.7). 
In a nutshell, the quality equilibrium on stage two, (qr∗g , q
r∗
b ), represented by equations
(4.4) and (4.5) is a stable, interior solution. Further, the non-deviation conditions for
both entrepreneurs are fulfilled.
A.7 Full market coverage for the unregulated equilibrium
As mentioned in this paper, full market coverage is guaranteed, given θˆ ≤ θ = θ − 1.
Using equations (4.4) and (4.3) together with equation (4.12), full market coverage is
guaranteed, if and only if
θ ≥ 1 +
√
64c(ξ − ρ)(ξ + ρ) + 75
4
√
3
= 1 + Θu, (9.10)
with Θu ≡
√
64c(ξ−ρ)(ξ+ρ)+75
4
√
3
. Now, it is straightforward to show that ∂Θ(·)
∂ρ
< 0 and
∂Θ(·)
∂ξ
> 0 with ξ < ρ and ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
4c
)
. Hence, θ¯ decreases with the R&D efficiency
parameter ρ but increases with the knowledge-spillover parameter ξ. Assuming for
a moment that ξ = ρ = 0, equation (9.10) reduces to θ¯ ≥ 9
4
which is in line with
the findings made by Ecchia and Lambertini (1998), who show that for θ¯ ≥ 9
4
a pure-
strategy and sub-game perfect equilibrium exists which guarantees full market coverage.
Suppose now, for ρ =
3
√
3
2
4c
equation (9.10) changes to θ ≥ 1
4
√
64cξ2
3
+ 7 + 1. Hence,
for ∀ ξ < ρ ∈
(
0,
3
√
3
2
4c
)
, θ ≥ 1.66144 establish a pure-strategy and sub-game perfect
equilibrium which is in line with full market coverage.
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A.8 Full market coverage for the regulated equilibrium
For the regulated economy, the condition for full market coverage turns out to be
θ¯ ≥ 1
4
√
640τ 2v (3e¯τe (τs − 1)− 2(ξ − ρ)(ξ + ρ))
3 (τs − 1) + 25− τeτv + 1 = 1 + Θ
r, (9.11)
with Θr ≡ 1
4
√
640τ2v (3e¯τe(τs−1)−2(ξ−ρ)(ξ+ρ))
3(τs−1) + 25 − τeτv. Equation (9.11) results if we use
equations (6.3) and (4.12). Now, increasing the emission tax τe, ceteris paribus, this
policy tends to increase the threshold θ¯ for τe ∈ (0, τ¯e) with τ¯e ≡
3840e¯2+
256(ξ−ρ)(ξ+ρ)
τs−1 −
15
τ2v
384e¯
but decreases for τe ∈ (τ¯e,∞+[. Further, the threshold increases with the ad-valorem
tax τv, which is in line with the findings made by Bre´card (2012) and decreases with the
process R&D subsidy rate τs. If the menu of policy instruments is set to {τs, τe, τv} =
{0, 0, 1}, equation (9.11) directly reduces to equation (9.10).
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